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 One of the most routing problems in Mobile Ad-hoc Network is the node’s 
selfishness. Nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own 
benefit; hence these nodes refuse to forward packet on behalf of others to 
preserve their limited energy resources. This selfishness may lead to a low 
efficiency of routing. Therefore, it is important to study mechanisms which 
can be used encourage cooperation among nodes, to maintain the network 
efficiency. In this paper, we propose a cooperative game theoretic model to 
support more energy-aware and available bandwidth routing in MANET. We 
introduce a novel framework from coalitional-formation game theory, called 
hedonic coalition-formation game. We integrate this model to OLSR 
protocol that is an optimization over the classical link state protocol for the 
MANETs. Within each coalition, a coalition coordinator acts as a special 
MPR node to improve the energy efficient and the packet success rate of the 
transmission. Simulation results show how the proposed algorithm improve 
the performance in terms of the percentage of selected MPR nodes in the 
network, the percentage of alive nodes by time, and the Packet Delivery 
Ratio. Which prove that our proposed model leads, to better results compared 
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Due to the recent emergence of large-scale, distributed and heterogeneous communication systems 
which are continuously increasing, next generation wireless networks will present a highly complex and 
dynamic environment. One class of such networks is Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET). In MANET, 
autonomous mobile nodes are deployed across the zone of a network. The mobility of the devices is 
infrastructure-less and lacks any permanent topology. One of the crucial tasks in MANET is routing, since 
the network is in general multi-hop, a routing protocol is needed in order to discover and maintain routes 
between far away nodes, allowing them to communicate along multi-hop paths. In particular, energy efficient 
routing may be the most important design criteria for MANETs, since mobile nodes will be powered by 
batteries with limited capacity. Power failure of a mobile node not only affects the node itself but also its 
ability to forward packets on behalf of others and thus the overall network lifetime. The nature of 
infrastructure-less communication in MANET necessitates engagement nodes to cooperate to keep the 
network performance. However a network node has no interest in forwarding a packet on behalf of another 
node since this action would only have the effect of consuming its energy and available bandwidth. This 
selfishness may lead to a low efficiency of routing in MANET. Moreover, to some nodes that are willing to 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
A Coalition-Formation Game Model for Energy-Efficient Routing in Mobile Ad-hoc … (Abdelkabir Sahnoun) 
27 
forward data packets for others, their energy may be depleted within a short period of time, and potentially 
bring the whole network down. 
In order to cope with this problem, several research activities to encourage nodes to cooperate have 
been recently proposed. The main approach considered is to give nodes some incentive for packet 
forwarding. Most of the existing work, to motivate nodes in ad hoc network to cooperate, can be divided into 
two main classes: credit-based and reputation-based. In credit-based systems [1-3], nodes uses virtual 
currency to pay for obtaining relay services, so nodes must obtain sufficient credit by providing service to 
other nodes. In reputation-based systems [4-7], nodes track the cooperation behavior of other nodes and use it 
to decide how much service to provide to them. However, it’s very difficult to adopt such a motivating 
mechanism for MANET. So the more appropriate tool for handling the forwarding behaviors in MANET 
with selfish nodes is game theory [8]. Examining cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks using game theory 
gives a more comprehensive perception of the process [9]. 
In this work, we define a cooperative game theoretic model to support more energy-aware and 
available bandwidth routing in MANET. In non-cooperative games, nodes act independently to enhance their 
own interests, while nodes in cooperative games may agree to form coalitions and make decisions based on 
collaborative strategies. We introduce a novel framework from coalitional-formation game theory, called 
hedonic coalition-formation game. Hedonic games have been widely used in game theory, especially in 
economic and political sciences fields. To the best of our knowledge, utilization of this framework in 
MANET has not been studied thoroughly. The proposed model adopts reachability with minimum overhead 
cost as a measure of the benefits of cooperation, and an appreciation of the re-transmission expenditure to 
evaluate the cooperation cost. After the coalition formation process reaches the steady state, we are interested 
in the stability of the formed coalitions. We integrate this model to OLSR protocol that is an optimization 
over the classical link state protocol for the MANETs. The effect of mobility on network topology is a key 
challenge in coalition formation. To prove the efficiency of our proposed approach, we simulate MANET 
with variant number of nodes. The simulation results show that our proposed model, based on coalitional 
formation game, can efficiently prolong the network lifetime. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related work is summarized in Section 2. 
System model and proposed algorithm are discussed in the Section 3. Simulation environment and results are 
presented in Section 4, and conclusion is articulated in Section 5. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
The problem of designing efficient protocols for MANET has received significant attention by the 
research community for over a decade. Many efficient schemes have been developed. In [10] the author 
showed the pefromance of 802.11 MAC on basis of broadcasting traffic load using random waypoint model 
In MANET. He aimed to show effictive performance of constant bit rate based on broadcasting data from one 
network to other network. In [11] the authors modeled a rushing attack which is a powerful attack that 
exploits the weaknesses of the secure routing protocols in MANET, in order to know the weakness and 
strength of these protocols, it was necessary to test their performance in hostile environments. Subsequently, 
the performance was measured with the various metrics, some of them are average throughput, packet 
delivery ratio, and average end-to-end delay, to compare and evaluate their performance. 
In the last decade, much attention has been dedicated to game theoretical game models for wireless 
ad hoc network in general and for cooperation mechanisms precisely [12-14]. These works investigate 
multiple subjects concerning cooperative games, fair payoff allocation and trust models. The proposed works 
in cooperative games relying incentive mechanisms can be divided into two major classes: credit-based [1-3] 
and reputation-based [4-7]. Moreover many presented works adopt game theoretical models as a base of their 
proposed approach for enhancing packet forwarding in wireless ad hoc networks [15], [16]. The discrepancy 
between the benefit from cooperation and the required cost for cooperation prompts the researchers to adopt 
game theoretic models, where each player strategically decides, based on his payoff, to participate for the 
common good of the set or not. The players in game theory try to maximize an objective function that takes 
the form of a payoff. Players choose strategic actions and each player's payoff depends not only on his own 
action, but also on those of the other players. The global purpose of these games is to attain an equilibrium 
state where every player is satisfied and no participant wants to modify its cooperation choice. There are two 
main types of theoretical game: non-cooperative games and cooperative games. In non-cooperative games, 
each node has to select a strategy so as to maximize its own benefits by taking the suitable actions [17], [18]. 
In cooperative games, nodes must first decide whether or not to join a coalition that share common  
benefit [19-21]. 
In [22] Manam and Mahendran have investigated an analytical method to evaluate the effectiveness 
of some routing protocols considering that consists of selfish nodes that have different ranges of 
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transmission. However Wang and Singhal in [23] have proposed a novel routing algorithm for MANETs with 
selfish nodes. They present a protocol using a motivating mechanism to promote cooperation among nodes, 
their proposition concentrate on the truthfulness. Watchdog and pathrater are proposed in [24] to identify 
misbehaving nodes and deflect traffic around them. Reputation-based protocols are proposed in [25], [26]. 
In cooperation based on the notion of coalitional game theory [27], subgroups of nodes combine 
their forces and decide to act together, so that this formed coalition gives the optimum payoff. Therefore the 
formed coalitions should keep their stability. A coalition is stable if no node has an incentive to move from 
its current coalition to another or to deviate and act alone. However in MANETs, nodes may be obliged to 
quit their coalition due to topological changing condition caused by mobility. 
In [28] Omrani and Fallah investigated the concept of core in coalition game theory to discover a 
stable payment model for nodes that participate to forward packet on a cost efficient path. They set a fixed 
time slot as the duration of time in which nodes in the network do not change their positions, so that in this 
duration of a stable time slot, a node is able to find out the complete topology of the network. However this 
procedure could be useful in small networks with low mobility speed, but with a considerable mobility speed, 
this procedure has less efficiency. 
In [29] Cai and Pooch proposed an approach to increase the network lifetime by motivating nodes to 
collaborate to enhance the transmission power that allows delivering packets over shared routes. They adopt 
the notion of the shapely value to allocate the cooperation payoff fairly among the nodes which belong to a 
same coalition in MANET like as the forwarding cost is balanced over them. 
 
 
3. THE COMPREHENSIVE THEORETICAL BASIS AND PRPOSED METHOD 
3.1. Problem Description 
An ad hoc network is modeled as a directed graph        , where   and   are the set of nodes 
and the set of directed links respectively. Each element in   denotes that two nodes are within the radio range 
of each other. Nodes in the network are battery-powered and have limited computation and wireless 
communication capabilities. A node may be connected with several nodes nearby through wireless 
communication. Each node in a MANET is moving dynamically with its own track. Nodes in a MANET will 
generate data packets periodically and try to send out generated data packets to some destinations. 
Some nodes in MANET behave with selfishness, since they want to maximize their benefits with 
least cost to conserve their energies as much as possible during the routing process, which can affect the 
entire network if many nodes behave like that. However, it is required for nodes to forward data packets in 
order to benefit the overall network. To overcome this problem, we have proposed a new framework that 
allows investigating the problem of energy-efficiency routing in OLSR protocol by modeling it as a 
coalitional game theory, as each player in a cooperative game, the nodes attempt to combine their forces and 
decide to act together, so that this formed coalition gives the optimum common payoff. 
 
3.2. Brief Review of OLSR Routing Protocol 
 OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing), [30], is a proactive routing protocol where nodes 
periodically exchange topology information in order to establish a route to any destination in the network. It 
is an optimization of a pure link state routing protocol, based on the concept of multipoint relays (MPRs). 
First, using multipoint relays reduces the size of the control messages: rather than declaring its entire links in 
the network, a node declares only the set of links with its neighbors that have selected it as ―multipoint 
relay‖. The use of MPRs also minimizes flooding of control traffic. Indeed only multipoint relays forward 
control messages. This technique significantly reduces the number of retransmissions of broadcast messages. 
OLSR consists of two main functionalities: 
a) Neighborhood discovery. Each node acquires the knowledge of its one-hop and two-hop neighborhood by 
periodic Hello messages. It independently selects its own set of multipoint relays (MPRs), among its one-hop 
neighbors in such a way that its MPRs cover (in terms of radio range) all its two-hop neighbors. 
b) Topology dissemination. Each node also maintains topological information about the network obtained by 
TC (Topology Control) messages, broadcast by MPR nodes. 
Each node computes its routing table by the Dijkstra algorithm. This table provides the shortest 
route (i.e. the route with the smallest hop number) to any destination in the network. 
 
3.3. Hedonic Coalition Formation Game 
In this section we introduce those concepts of hedonic coalitional formation game used in our 
proposed scheme. 
Hedonic coalitional formation games entail several interesting properties that can be applied, not 
only in economics and politics, but also in wireless ad hoc networks as we will define in this work. A 
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coalition formation game is called to be hedonic if the gain of any player depends solely on the members of 
the coalition to which the player belongs, and the coalitions form as a result of the preferences of the players 
over their possible coalitions’ set. 
Before discussing the application of hedonic game in our proposed scheme, we give some 
definitions, taken from [31]. 
Definition.1: A coalition structure or a coalition partition is defined as the set   {          } 
which partitions the players set N, i.e.,           are disjoint coalitions such that     
      . 
Definition.2: Given a partition   of N, for every player      we denote by      , the coalition 
    , such that      . 
In a hedonic coalition formation game framework, every player has to build preferences over its 
own set of possible coalitions, in order to be able to choose which coalition he prefers being a member of. 
For evaluating these preferences of the players over the coalitions, we define the concept of a preference 
relation or order as follows [31]: 
Definintion.3: For any player     , a preference relation or order    is defined as a complete, 
reflexive, and transitive binary relation over the set of all coalitions that player   can possibly form, i.e., the 
set {           }. 
Hence for a player     , if there are two coalitions      and      such that       and 
     ,        means that player   prefers to be part of coalition   , over being part of coalition   . The 
preference relation can be a function of many parameters, such as the payoffs that the players receive from 
each coalition. 
A hedonic coalition formation game is formally defined as follows [31]: 
Definition.4: A hedonic coalition formation game is a coalitional game that satisfies the two hedonic 
conditions previously prescribed, and is defined by the pair       where   is the set of players, and   is a 
profile of preferences, i.e., preference relations (   , . . . . , | |) defined for every player in  . 
 
3.4. System Modeling 
 After introducing the main concepts of hedonic coalition formation games, we adopt this 
framework in order to propose a suitable solution for the energy aware problem in MANET. Hence the 
MANET routing behavior is modeled as a       hedonic game, where   is the set of nodes in the network, 
and   is a profile of preferences that we will define. 
To assess nodes performance, a weight is assigned dynamically to each node (  ), which takes into 
account cross layer parameters; these parameters include network congestion, residual energy of mobile 
nodes, as well as, network topology parameters. We combine these metrics with some multiplicative factors 
to compute a weight for each node  , as shown in Equation (1). 
 
                         
   
     
      (1) 
 
Where           ,      is the residual energy at each time,       is the number of nodes that 
belong to one-hop neighborhood of  ,     is the number of packets in the MAC queue and       is the 
maximum considered MAC queue size of  . By varying the weighting factors, we can change the importance 




The first modification we made in OLSR structure is to embed the nodes’ weight value to the Hello 
messages that are periodically generated by each node. So Hello packet is extended to include a field for the 
updated weight. In order to partition the network into coalitions and define a set of optimal coalition 
coordinator (CC), each node declares its neighbor which has the maximal weight value. A node can also 
declare itself, if it has the maximal weight value. The nodes use their Hello messages to broadcast their 
declarations. Hence we have one-hop coalitional model, each node is one-hop away from its designated 
coalition coordinator. 
After defining the coalition coordinators, each coordinator would act as MPR nodes for its coalition 
members. Hence, these coalition coordinators should broadcast Hello messages that include their coalition 
members in their MPR selector set. Some other modifications must be done to the Hello structure. We add an 
indicator that a node has been declared as a coalition coordinator, a second indicator that a neighbor has been 
declared as a coalition coordinator. The results of the coalition coordinators declarations must be propagated 
to all the neighbors. 
In this case there are two types of communication, intra-coalition communication and inter-coalition 
communication. In the intra-coalition communication, inside the coalition the coalition coordinator can 
directly communicate with every member node. In order to enhance energy consumption, only the coalition 
coordinator is continuously on active mode, and the members which are not working are kept on sleep mode. 
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Hence if any node wants to send a packet to one of sleeping nodes, it can just forward it to the coalition 
coordinator that send an acknowledgement to the destination, and it changes its mode to active mode to 
receive the packet, after finishing their communication it will again come on sleep mode. However in the 
inter-coalition communication, forwarding packets between any source-destination nodes will be done by 
means of their coalition coordinators, the coalition coordinator of the source nodes use the concept of MPR to 
forward the packet to the destination’s coalition coordinator, which would minimize the congestion by 
reducing the number of forwarding nodes. 
For modeling the MANET routing behavior as a hedonic coalition formation game, the preference 
relations of the players have to be defined. So we define a preference relation indicating the preference of 
nodes. We assume that the preference relation is common for all nodes in the network  , hence we denote it 
by                . The preference of any node      is giving as shown in Equation (2). 
 
       
 
⇔                   (2) 
 
Where       and      are two coalitions that the node   is a one-hop neighbor with their 
coalition coordinator, (in principle   is a member of the coalition that its coalition coordinator had the highest 
weight at declaration coordinator time). And      | |    is a preference function defined as follows: 
 
                    (3) 
 
Where        is the coalition coordinator’s weight of the coalition  . By using the defined 
preference relation, the players can compare two coalitions    and    to choose which one to be member in. 
regarding to this model, being a coalition coordinator, obligates this player to act as a common MPR for the 
other members, however the ordinary members have to provide forwarding services for any packet sourced 
by the coalition coordinator. The payoff that a node receives by being in a coalition is the number of nodes 
that can reach intra-coalition and inter-coalition by means of one MPR node (CC), hence this approach is 
able to prolong the network lifetime by reducing the percentage of MPR nodes which eventually reduces the 
traffic overhead and channel collisions, moreover the energetic conservation by passing to sleep mode. 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section we will describe the simulation setup and results used to evaluate our modified 
version of OLSR (with coalition formation) compared to the classical one, by means of NS3 network 
simulator. We considered three performance metrics to evaluate this proposition, which are: 
a. The percentage of selected MPR nodes in the network. 
b. Nodes lifetime: the percentage of alive nodes by time. 
c. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): the ratio of the number of packets delivered to the destination nodes 
over the number of packets sent by the source nodes. 
We simulated a MANET with a variant number of nodes, within a 800 x 800 meter square area, the 
size of generating packets is 1024 bytes, mobile nodes move in the area based on a Random Waypoint 
mobility model with maximum speed of 15 m/sec, the simulation time is set to 400 seconds. The simulation 
parameters are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Simulation Parameters 
Area 800m x 800m 
Nodes 40, 60, 80, 100, 120 
Traffic Type CBR / UDP 
Packet Size 1024 bytes 
Start of Traffic 50 seconds 
Transmission Power 10 dbm 
Link bandwidth 2 Mb/s 
Initial Node Energy 0.4 Joules 
Simulations/Scenario 4 times 
Nodes’ speed 15 m/sec 
Simulation time 300 seconds 
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We simulated a MANET with variant nodes’ number, we aimed to assess our proposed algorithm 
from overhead point of view, by comparing the percentage of selected MPR nodes in the network, the 
percentage of alive nodes by time, and PDR between modified and standard OLSR. 
As shown in Figure 1, the OLSR with coalition formation obviously minimized the number of 
selected MPR nodes. Because these MPRs contain the coalition coordinators, that behave as special MPR 
nodes. So the ordinary MPRs are selected by a lessen number of nodes (coalition coordinators) than in 
standard OLSR. Thus the coalitional formation model would minimize the network congestion due to the 
considerable number of control message that be avoided, hence it would be more convenient for dense 
networks. By our protocol model there is a decreasing of about 22% of MPR nodes compared to the standard 
OLSR. 
Figure 2 shows that our modified protocol outperform the standard one in prolonging the network 
lifetime, first because we have less number of MPR nodes which eventually reduces the traffic overhead and 
channel collisions, and the second reason is the fact that keeping nodes in sleep mode when there is no 
forwarding service to do, which reduce significantly the energy consumption of nodes. Moreover, our 
modified scheme achieves more uniform utilization of network resources by adopting the residual energy 





Figure 1. Percentage of MPR nodes 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of Alive nodes 
 
 
The packet delivery ratio is one of the important aspects that we consider in our proposed scheme. 
In Figure 3 We can observe that PDR has an improvement reach to up to 4% in the case of our formation 
model OLSR, due to the fact queue utilization is taken in consideration as important criteria in computing the 
weight for nodes, based in, nodes declare coalition coordinator that act as a specialized MPRs, thus our 
model gives a priority to nodes that less congested to be coalition coordinators, because, as known, the 





Figure 3. Packet delivery Ratio 
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In summary, after have analyzing the previous results, we can conclude that the coalitional 
formation model of OLSR protocol has more chance to extend network lifetime due to its propriety to select 
less number of MPRs, hence minimizing the traffic overhead and channel collision, and encouraging 
cooperation in the network. Moreover this model takes in consideration energy efficiency while choosing the 




In this paper, we introduced a cooperation model in MANETs based on coalitional formation game 
theory. In the proposed model, the nodes in MANET are required to collaborate among them to efficiently 
forward packets during routing process in the network, the MANET routing behavior is modeled as a hedonic 
coalition formation game among nodes in order to form disjoint coalitions. To form the coalitions, we adopt 
an algorithm that allows declaring a coalition coordinator by neighbor nodes based on cross layer parameters; 
these parameters include network congestion, residual energy of mobile nodes, as well as, network topology 
parameters, then the ordinary nodes would join or leave the coalitions base on their preferences. We integrate 
this model to OLSR protocol, where the coalition coordinators act as special MPRs. Moreover, we compare 
between our modified OLSR with coalition formation and the standard one. Simulation results show how the 
proposed algorithm improve the performance in terms of the percentage of selected MPR nodes in the 
network, the percentage of alive nodes by time, and the Packet Delivery Ratio. Which prove that our 
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